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Jones v. Cooper
311 F.3d 306 (4th Cir. 2002)
Lyons v. Lee
316 F.3d 528 (4th Cir. 2003)
I. Facts
William Quentin Jones ("Jones') entered a Fast Fare convenience store in
the Raleigh area just before midnight on March 7, 1987. Jones fired an Uzi 9
m.m. pistol several times; the shots wounded one man and killed another. He
then ordered the store's clerk to open the cash register. When the clerk was
unable to do so, Jones dragged the register into the street by its cord and fled.
Jones was apprehended, arrested, and interrogated; -he pleaded guilty to firstdegree murder and received a sentence of death.'
In Jones's first appeal to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, his death
sentence was vacated and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. At the second
sentencing hearing, none of the jurors found any mitigating factors. Jones was
again sentenced to death, and the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed his
sentence. Jones filed a Motion for Appropriate Relief ("MAR') and alleged that
a juror lied during voir dire and on the jury questionnaire. The state court
quashed the supporting affidavit and dismissed the motion. Jones's attorney later
discovered the identity of a jailer who recorded in the jail's log that, on the night
of the defendant's arrest, he seemed to be coming down from a drug high and
appeared remorseful.2
At this point, Jones filed a second MAR which alleged that the State violated Brady v. Maylana when it failed to disclose the jail log and the identity of
the jailer or, in the alternative, that counsel had been ineffective because they
failed to uncover this information.4 The state court rejected both claims because
they were not alleged in Jones's initial MAR and, therefore, were procedurally
defaulted.' Jones filed a habeas petition in federal district court and re-asserted

1. Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 308-09 (4th Cir. 2002).
2. Id.at 309.
3. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
4. Jones, 311 F.3d at 309 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,87 (1963) (holding that "the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment")).
5. Id.
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both claims, but the district court dismissed his petition.6 Jones appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.'
Two months after the Fourth Circuit decidedJones, it decided another North
Carolina case, Lyons v. Lee.8 On September 25, 1993, Robbie James Lyons
("Lyons") entered a small market in Winston-Salem carrying a long-barreled .22
caliber gun. Lyons fired the gun five times and killed the owner of the store.
The jury found Lyons guilty of attempted armed robbery and first-degree murder
and recommended a sentence of death. The court then imposed a sentence of
death.9
During the sentencing phase, the State argued only one aggravating circumstance: Lyons had been twice convicted of violent felonies. The State offered
evidence of two previous convictions, one for armed robbery and one for
common law robbery. The jury determined that this aggravating factor was
sufficient to recommend a sentence of death, although it also found two statutory and four non-statutory mitigators. On direct appeal, no error was found.
In 1997, Lyons filed a MAR for the common law robbery conviction that
influenced his death sentence and a second MAR for his first-degree murder
conviction. The Supreme Court of North Carolina denied relief. Lyons then
filed two petitions for habeas relief in federal district court--one that challenged
his common law robbery conviction and one that challenged his murder conviction. The district court dismissed Lyons's petitions and refused to issue certificates of appealability. Lyons appealed to the Fourth Circuit seeking review on
four issues: his common law robbery conviction, use of the robbery conviction
in his capital sentencing proceeding, the court's jury instructions during his
sentencing phase, and North Carolina's short form indictment.' °
II. Holing
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied Jones's
request for a certificate of appealability." Jones's two claims, that his right to an
impartial jury had been violated and that a Brady violation had occurred, did not
amount to a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right. 2 The
Fourth Circuit also declined to issue a certificate of appealability to the defendant
in Lyons and determined that none of his claims amounted to a substantial
showing of a denial of a constitutional right. 3

6.
7.
8.

Id. The district court refused to issue a certificate of appealability. Id.
Id. at 308.
Lyons v. Lee, 316 F.3d 528, 528 (4th Cir. 2003).

9.

Id.
at 530-31.

10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 532.
Jones, 311 F.3d at 308.
Id.
Lyons, 316 F.3d at 530.

2003]

JONES & LYONS

IlL. Anay s
A. ProceduralStandards
Both Lyons and Jones appealed to the Fourth Circuit after the district court
denied their petitions for habeas relief and refused to issue certificates of
appealability. 4 For the Fourth Circuit to hear their appeals, the court must first5
decide whether to grant the petitioners certificates of appealability ("COA").1
In both Lyons and Jones, the Fourth Circuit refused to issue a COA."6 However,
in each case, after the Fourth Circuit refused to issue a COA, it entertained the
petitioner's claim on the merits.
In Lyons, the Fourth Circuit outlined the standards used to determine if a
COA should issue.17 The court cited 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) and Slack v. McDaniel'
to explain that the petitioner needs to show that "reasonable jurists could debate
whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved
in a different manner or that the issues presented were 'adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.."',. After announcing this standard, the court
considered each of Lyons's four claims, reached a substantive conclusion, then
used its substantive conclusion to support its denial of a COA. 0 For example,
Lyons challenged his first-degree murder conviction on the ground that the
common law robbery conviction, which supported the State's sole aggravator,
was an unconstitutional conviction."' The Fourth Circuit considered the claim
and applied the rule stated in Lackawanna Counoy DistrictAttorney v. Coss.' The
court ruled that the Lackawanna standard-a petitioner cannot challenge an
enhanced sentence based on the unconstitutionality of the prior
conviction-applied to Lyons.' The court concluded that Lyons's case did not
constitute an exception under Lackawannaand determined that Lyons's argument
was "without merit. '24 After this discussion of the merits, the court restated the

14. Jones, 311 F.3d at 308; Lyons, 316 F.3d at 530.
15.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (stating that a certificate of appealability may not issue unless
the applicant makes a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right"; part of AEDPA).
16. Jones, 311 F.3d at 308; Lyons, 316 F.3d at 530.
17.
Lyons, 316 F.3d at 532.
18.
529 U.S. 473 (2000).
19.
Lyons, 316 F.3d at 532 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (clarifying
the standard which must be met for a COA to issue)); see 28 U.S.C. 5 2253(c).
20.
Lyons, 316 F.3d at 532-35.
21.
Id. at 533.
22.
Id. (citing Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 403-04 (2001)
(explaining that a defendant cannot challenge an enhanced sentence based upon the unconstitutionality of a prior conviction)).
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
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COA standard and announced that the claim did not meet the standard.2" The
court treated each of Lyons's three claims similarly.26 It appears that, in actuality,
the court moved through all four claims and considered whether the district
court's decisions to deny habeas relief were appropriate.27 This analysis would
make sense if the Fourth Circuit began its analysis with a grant of a COA rather
than a denial.
Shortly after the Fourth Circuit decided Lyons, the United States Supreme
Court decided Miller-Ely. Cockrd/.2' The Court in Miller-Elexplainedthat before
a circuit court can hear a claim on the merits, it must issue a COA.29 A COA can
only issue if the petitioner has made a substantial showing of a denial of a
constitutional right. The standard for a "substantial showing" is whether reasonable jurists could debate the district court's application of AEDPA to the petitioner's claim.3" The Court stated that this process requires only a threshold
inquiry into the facts and that the AEDPA statute forbids engaging in a debate
on the merits to justify a denial of a COA.3" This error was present in the Fourth
Circuit's analysis in Lyons, the court denied the COA based on the merits of
Lyons's claims.
The Fourth Circuit committed the same error in Jones. The Fourth Circuit
in Jones also refused to grant a COA, but then included a lengthy discussion on
the merits of each claim. Like in Lyons, the court announced the standard for
issuing a COA and then refused to issue one.32 The court then plunged into a
discussion on the merits. By the time the court reached Jones's second claim, it
momentarily abandoned the COA standard and applied the standard for claims
that are heard on the merits, stating that the "appellant is not entitled to relief
unless he can show that this determination was an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme
Court."33 Because the Fourth Circuit included such an involved analysis in its

25.
Id.
26.
Lyons, 316 F.3d at 532-35.
27.
See id.
28.
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1034 (2003) (holding that a petitioner must
demonstrate a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right before a COA may issue);
see Priya Nath, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF.J. 407 (2003) (analyzing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S.Ct.
1029 (2003)).
29.
Milkr.E, 123 S. Ct. at 1039.
30.
Id.
31.
Id. (stating that "[w]hen a court of appeals side steps this process by first deciding the
merits of an appeal, and then justifying its denial of a COA based on its adjudication of the actual
merits, it is in essence deciding an appeal without jurisdiction").
32. Jones, 311 F.3d at 309-10.
33.
Id. at 314 (citing 28 U.S.C. §2254(d) (2000) (stating that a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to a state court decision can only be granted if the state court decision was contrary to or an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; part of AEDPA)).
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denial of a COA in Jones, it is clear how the court will treat both of the claims at
issue if they are ever brought for a determination on the merits.
B. JurorDeceit
The Fourth Circuit analyzed Jones's juror deceit claim under the test
advanced in McDonough Power Equpment, Inc. v. Greenwood.34 This two-part test
requires the defendant to demonstrate that a juror did not respond truthfully to
a material question during voir dire and that a truthful response would have
resulted in valid grounds to support a challenge for cause.3" AfterJones's second
sentencing proceeding, defense counsel received an affidavit from an investigator
who had interviewed the questionable juror.36 The affidavit stated that the juror
knew that the defendant had received a sentence of death in his first trial, that
several of her family members had been involved in arrests or jury trials, that she
had visited the scene of the robbery and murder the day after it occurred, and
that she was strongly against illegal drug use. 37 However, on the jury questionnaire the juror indicated that she did not have any friends or family who had
been arrested or subjected to a jury trial." During voir dire, the juror stated that
she never went to the convenience store and that she only had a vague knowledge of the robbery and murder.39
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the defendant that the juror had lied on the
jury questionnaire.' A truthful statement would have indicated that the juror did
have family members who had been arrested and/or subjected to a trial."
However, the Fourth Circuit also found that a truthful statement probably would
have suggested to the defense that the juror would be sympathetic to the defendant.42 The truthful statement would not have resulted in a challenge for cause,
thereby failing the second part of the McDonough test.43 As to the juror's responses on voir dire, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that they were colloquial
expressions and reasonable responses in the context of the questions asked.'
None of the voir dire responses amounted to the deceit required by the first part
of the McDonough test.4"
34.
Id.at 310; seeMcDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984)
(oudining a two-part test to obtain a new trial for juror deceit).
35. Jones, 311 F.3d at 310 (citing McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556).
36.

Id. at 311.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 312.
Jones, 311 F.3d at 312.
Id. at 313.

Id.
Id.at 311-12.
Id.at 312.
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During voir dire, the juror also indicated that she supported the death
penalty when it was appropriate and gave examples of appropriate circumstances
arising in cases of torture or brutal crimes.' The juror stated that she could fairly
balance aggravating factors and mitigating factors.47 When questioned postsentencing by the investigator though, the juror stated that "the Bible mandates
imposition of the death penalty in every case of first degree murder" and that she
could not imagine a first degree murder case in which a death sentence would be
inappropriate unless "the defendant grew up in a jungle with no contact with
humanity."48 The court decided that these responses were not inconsistent and
that the statements did not imply that the juror could not disregard her personal
pro-death feelings and act as a fair juror.49
C. Brady Violation
The Fourth Circuit then turned to Jones's Brady claim. The state court
rejected Jones's second MAR, which alleged the State's Brady violation, on two
separate grounds.' The state court first determined that the Brady claim was
procedurally defaulted because it was not raised during the first MAR; the state
court then determined that even if the Brady claim was evaluated on its merits,
the information was insufficient to result in a reasonable doubt in the mind of
the fact-finder "as to the correctness and appropriateness of the defendant's
death sentence."51 The Fourth Circuit reviewed the information that the jailor
provided to support his opinion that the defendant appeared to be on drugs and
concluded that the factors listed-fatigue, slurred speech, and slowed responses--could have been a result of being chased and interrogated by police
officers.52 Therefore, it was reasonable for the state court to conclude that the
evidence was unconvincing and would not have raised a reasonable doubt
regarding a sentence of death in the mind of a juror.5 3 Similarly, the Fourth
Circuit found the jailor's opinion that the defendant demonstrated remorse to be
unconvincing.'s Because the jury had not been swayed by the defendant's own
statements of remorse, it was reasonable for the state court to conclude that the
jailor's opinion would not have influenced a juror sufficiently to find a mitigating

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Jones, 311 F.3d at 312.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 314.
Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 477).
Id. at 315.
See Jones, 311 F.3d at 315.
Id.
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factor. 55 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the state court's
denial of Jones's
56
second MAR was a reasonable application of federal law.
IV. Application in Virginia
The procedural confusion in both Lyons and Jones is worth noting. In both
cases, the court denied the petitioner the right to be heard on the merits, and
then it offered an opinion on the merits. In practicality, making a substantial
showing of a violation of a constitutional right seems to entail convincing the
Fourth Circuit that the petitioner is entitled to habeas relief on the merits. While
the merit discussions were short and cursory in Lyons, they were involved determinations in Jones.
The investigation of the questionable juror in Jones revealed that the juror
clearly lacked the ability to consider mitigating factors fairly. 7 Nevertheless, the
Fourth Circuit stated that it did not believe her sentiments prevented her from
acting as an impartial juror and it would not provide relief.5" Jones revealed that
the Fourth Circuit will not, on appeal, find that a juror did not act impartially
even given this instance of a gross admission to the investigator." In order to
compensate for this reality, attorneys must focus on a potential juror's openness
to mitigation during voir dire.
Had the juror's opinion regarding mitigating factors been revealed during
voir dire, she would have been unfit to serve under the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Morgan v. I1I6nois.'° Like Virginia's capital sentencing statute,
the Illinois death penalty statute at issue in Morgan provided that "[t]he court shall
consider, or shall instruct the jury to consider any aggravating and any mitigating
factors which are relevant to the imposition of the death penalty."61 The Court
stated that "[a]ny juror who states that he or she will automatically vote for the
death penalty without regard to the mitigating evidence is announcing an intention not to follow the instructions to consider the mitigating evidence and to
55.

Id.

56.
Id. at 315-16. Again, this language is not the correct standard of review for a denial of
a COA. See § 2253(c)(2).
57.
SeeJones, 311 F.3d at 311-12.
58.
Id.at 312-13.
59.
See Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 363-64 (4th Cir. 1998). During the voir dire for
Fitzgerald's trial, the trial court asked a potential juror if anyone in his family had been a victim of
rape and the juror's response was "no." Id. at 363. The juror also indicated that he could give
Fitzgerald a fair trial. Id. However, during the jury deliberations the juror stated that he didn't have
any sympathy for rapists because his granddaughter had been molested and he urged the other jury
members to sentence Fitzgerald to life imprisonment for rape. Id. Fitzgerald appealed and argued
that he had been denied an impartial jury, but the state court found that the voir dire responses
were honest and accurate; the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the state court's
decision. Id. at 363-64.
60.
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 739 (1992) (holding that the inadequacy of voir dire
resulted in a jury that did not satisfy the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment).
61.
Id.at 737. For the equivalent provision in Virginia see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(D)
(Michie 2000) (requiring that the jury consider evidence in support of mitigation).

CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:2

decide if it is suffident to preclude imposition of the death penalty." 62 The pertinent lesson for Virginia capital defense attorneys is that they must surmise during
voir dire not only in what cases a juror would find a sentence of death appropriate, but also if the juror can think of any circumstances in which a sentence of
death would be inappropriate. For example, a capital defense attorney can rely
on Morgan to posit the following question on voir dire: Can you think of any
personal hardships or circumstances that a defendant has endured which could
convince you that a sentence of death is inappropriate? If the juror responds
negatively, or reveals an opinion like the juror held in Jones-only if the defendant was raised in a jungle without human contact-it should be clear that the
juror cannot consider both aggravating factors and mitigating factors impartially
and should be struck for cause. Determining the juror's feelings toward mitigating factors during voir dire is critical because Jones makes it clear that relief is
virtually unavailable post-conviction, even in a case of juror deceit.
The Fourth Circuit in Jones would not acknowledge that the defendant
suffered any prejudice during his sentencing as a result of the alleged Brady
violation.63 Attorneys can seek some support in the language of Brady to try to
overcome the challenges of establishing prejudice to the defendant. Brady was
found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.64 The exculpatory
evidence was a confession to the murder made by Brady's companion.6" The
Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the confession would not have altered
the guilt/innocence portion of the trial, but it remanded the case for a new
sentencing proceeding.66 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's decision.67 In doing so, the Court also affirmed the lower court's decision
that the suppressed evidence did require a retrial on the issue of punishment.66
The Brady requirement of disclosure was not limited to exculpatory evidence
applicable to guilt/innocence; at issue in Brady was exculpatory evidence that
affected sentencing.69 The Court in Brady quotes and does not contradict the
lower court's decision that "[ilt
would be 'too dogmatic' for us to say that the
jury would not have attached any significance to this evidence in considering the
punishment of the defendant Brady. 7 Capital attorneys could rely on this
distinction in Brady to advocate that the system of aggravating and mitigating
factors used in determining a sentence of death is more delicate than a determi62.
Morgan, 504 U.S. at 738 (emphasis in original).
63. Jones, 311 F.3d at 315-16.
64.
Brady, 373 U.S. at 84.
65.
Id.
66.
Id.at 85.
67.
Id. at 87.
68.
Id. at 85.
69.
Id. at 87 (holding that suppression of favorable evidence to an accused violates due
process "where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment. .."(emphasis added)).
70.
Brady, 373 U.S. at 88 (emphasis omitted).
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nation of guilt or innocence. In Brady, the Court would not presume what
significance new evidence would have on the mind of the sentencing juror;
therefore, the prejudice threshold for exculpatory sentencing evidence should be
lower than the threshold for exculpatory guilt/innocence evidence. 7 Nevertheless, the decision in Jones underscores the need for attorneys to be prepared for
the inevitable reluctance on the part of courts to find actual prejudice as a result
of a Brady violation.
Janice L. Kopec

71.

See id.
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